## The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival

By C.A.E. Goodhart


Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics

and


Manoj Pradhan Talking Heads Macroeconomics


# Demography (and some reversal of globalisation) will raise inflation

## Echoes of the 1950s



## Working age populations falling globally – Africa is the key exception, and India to a lesser extent





## The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's Employment



Source: Goldin (Richard T. Ely lecture, 2006)


## **Inequality has Narrowed Across Economies**

#### Ratio of workers wages

	USA/China	France/Poland
2000	34.6	3.9
2001	30.6	3.3
2002	27.4	3.5
2003	25.0	4.0
2004	22.9	4.2
2005	20.4	3.8
2006	18.1	3.7
2007	15.2	3.5
2008	12.2	3.0
2009	10.8	3.7
2010	9.7	3.3
2011	8.4	3.3
2012	7.5	3.4
2013	6.7	3.4
2014	6.3	3.3
2015	6.0	3.4
2016	5.9	3.4
2017	5.6	3.2
2018	5.1	2.9

Source National Sources


## Consumption of the old *increases*



## Debt falls after wars, but that will not apply to ageing

#### Debt and deficits

Federal debt held by the public is projected to equal 195% of GDP in 2050, and the deficit is projected to equal 13% of GDP



In CBO's projections, federal debt held by the public surpasses its historical high of 106 percent of GDP in 2023 and continues to climb in most years thereafter. In 2050, debt as a percentage of GDP is nearly 2.5 times what it was at the end of last year.

## **The endgame? Inflation**

### **Dealing with Debt**

- Growth unlikely
- Productivity yes, but modest
- Taxation the 'right' solution, but politically difficult
- Inflation unattractive, but necessary

### **Environmental focus**

• Inflationary?


#### Why didn't it happen in Japan? How will the pandemic impact our thesis?

China put the Phillips curve in a coma. The pandemic/demography will revive it

## China put the Phillips Curve in a Coma

#### Phillips curve's slope


Closer to zero = weaker connection between US unemployment rate and previous 20 years of price inflation




Hooper et al., 2019

#### China Disinflated the World, and Raised Growth Too


**Chart 2: Global Inflation** 



## **China's Investment Drive Allowed the US to Consume**




### Friedman vs Phillips – A historic divide




## r\* in the Short vs Long Run

## Central Banks control short-term r, unless vigilantes intervene








## Laubach-Williams: In Theory, Not in Practise


There are two key 'unobservable' equations in the LW Model, one for equilibrium rates  $(r^*)$  and the other for potential growth  $(y^*)$ 


"Economic theory implies that trend growth (g) is one determinant of r<sup>\*</sup>. Hence, we specify"




#### Hamilton et al (2015)

Real GDP growth and real interest rates do not show a correlation that can form the basis for the LW system of equations.








## Long-run r\*: Savings could fall by more than Investment



Markers correspond to 1995, 00, 05, 10, 15 and 2017 data points








#### US: % of Sample That Moved Home


## Why Didn't It Happen in Japan?

## **Spot the Difference**



## "Why didn't it happen in Japan" – A Revisionist History

#### Japan Inc. Invested Heavily Abroad



Japan: M2 Growth vs Output Gap



MACROBOND

## Conclusions

- Inflation is coming. Post GFC: QE injections into Wall Street. Today: Fiscal injections into the high street, financed by monetary policy.
- The yield curve will steepen: Breakevens higher than nominals everywhere, but the breakevens curve is inverted
- Asset returns will be harder to extract. The ESG implications of demography and inflation will be pervasive.
- Lower within-country inequality, but in the context of lower growth
- Central bank independence under increasing threat