



TRAINING COURSE

Managing and Understanding Sovereign Debt Risks and Restructuring

Organised by: The Florence School of Banking and Finance

Course Instructors:

Lee C. Buchheit | Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP

Mitu Gulati | Duke University

Jeromin Zettelmeyer | Peterson Institute of International Economics

Sala Europa

Villa Schifanoia, Via Boccaccio 121 - Florence

24-25 APRIL 2018

THE COURSE WILL ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS

- How do sovereign borrowers get into trouble?
- The warning signs of sovereign distress.
- Initial maneuvers to escape and evade the crisis.
- The options when the initial maneuvers don't work bailout or restructure
- The evolution of sovereign debt restructuring techniques 1982 to 2017
- The role of the official sector
- Contractual provisions that facilitate, or that retard, sovereign debt workouts
- Sovereign debt restructuring after Greece and Argentina

PROGRAMME

24 APRIL	
09.00 - 09.15	Welcome by Pierre Schlosser Florence School of Banking and Finance and Introduction by Mitu Gulati
09.15 - 10.45	Session 1: Sovereign financial distress (Jeromin Zettelmeyer)
	 A very brief history of international finance
	 Sovereign debt crises: stylized facts
	 Diagnosing sovereign debt crises
	 Resolving the crisis: to adjust or to restructure? Procrastination and gambles for redemption The role and limitations of international crisis lenders
10.45 - 11.00	Coffee break
11.00 - 12.30	Session 2: The balloon goes up (Lee Buchheit)
	■ Bail-in or bail-out?
	 The pros and cons of pre-emptive debt restructurings
	Prioritizing debt categories ("excluded" debt)
	■ The sovereign debt restructurer's toolkit
	 Factors influencing the choice of a debt restructuring method Illiquidity v insolvency Exposure of local financial institutions Foreign creditor expectations IMF expectations
	 Creditor consultation (creditor committees and all of that)
	■ Paris Club/London Club coordination
12.30 - 14.00	Lunch - Guest Speaker Georg Vanberg Duke University Constitutions and Financial Crises
14.00 - 15.45	Session 3: Encouraging creditor participation in sovereign debt workouts (Mitu Gulati)
	■ The holdout creditor problem
	 Contractual tools to deter holdouts

- Collective action clauses

- Trustees v. fiscal agents

- Exit consents

- Withholding tax
- Local law debt
- Financial/legal inducements
 - Value recovery instruments
 - Co-financing features
 - Loss reinstatement features
 - Participation fees
 - "Menu of options"
 - Change governing law
- Negative inducements
 - Threats of non-payment (RUFO-style clauses)
 - Immunize debtor assets (Iraq 2003-09)

15.45 - 16.00 *Coffee break*

16.00 -16.30 **Session 4: Dealing with holdouts (Lee Buchheit)**

- The litigation threat
- The public relations threat
- The pari passu threat
- Legal defenses (sovereign immunity, act of state, comity)

16.30 - 17.30 **Session 5: Case study: Greece (Jeromin Zettelmeyer)**

- Background
- Initial policy (full bailout May 2010 to March 2012)
- PSI 1 (summer of 2011)
 Official sector volte-face (October 26/27, 2011)
- Exclusion of bonds held by official sector actors
- Greece's offer to creditors
- "Retrofit" collective action mechanism
- Results
- Treatment of holdout bonds
- OSI (Official Sector Involvement) discussions

17.30 - 18.30 *Cocktail*

25	ADDT	T
40	ALVI	ட

14.00 - 17.30

09.00 - 10.30	Session 6: Proposals to reform the machinery of sovereign debt workouts (Mitu Gulati)
	 Criticisms of the current approach to sovereign debt restructuring
	 Anne Krueger's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (2002)
	IMF's reprofiling policy
	■ Enhanced CACs
	 Criticisms of SDRM-type mechanisms
10.30 - 10.45	Coffee break
10.45 - 12.30	Session 7: Sovereign debt restructuring in Europe (Jeromin Zettelmeyer)
	 The euro-area debt crisis (2010-2015) The official sector actors Policies Euro-area CACs Proposals for a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
12.30 - 14.00	Lunch

Session 8: Ruritania's Sovereign Debt Restructuring (war game)