The e-books following the Annual Conference of the Florence School of Banking and Finance are available for downloading free-of-charge:
This ebook summarizes the contributions of the speakers in the 2016 conference. The first part centres around the debate on the desirability of having a debt restructuring regime in Europe and asks whether the ‘no bail-out’ requirement and the ‘no debt restructuring’ mantra can be compatible in EMU. The second part analyses the implications of incomplete, horizontal agreements among EU and EMU member states and discusses the sensitive (and largely unsettled) matter of withdrawals, exits and expulsions from participating in those different governance arrangements. In particular, it considers the implications of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. The third part, lastly, addresses the Banking Union and finds that the newest layer of European governance appears to be plagued by gaps in governance even before it has got off the ground.
This publicaiton follows the 2015 Annual Conference. The following key thoughts are central to the book: 1. Despite its incomplete nature, the Banking Union represents a great achievement in terms of financial stability control, thus ensuring a more resilient euro area. 2. By contrast, the exact objective, scope and institutional capabilities of the Capital Markets Union remain a puzzle to many participants. 3. Risks of regulatory fragmentation arising between the European Union and the Euro Area are somewhat exaggerated, it was overall felt. The existence of European platforms such as the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) acts as a safeguard to the integrity of the single market.
This book contains the proceedings from the 2014 Annual Conference. The contributions published in this book discuss the new regulatory and supervisory architecture in the Eurozone, and loss distribution in the event of default of both banks and sovereigns. They all bring a collective answer to the complex question of ‘Bearing the losses’, which was central to the Eurocrisis crisis from the beginning. Should the losses be paid by the private or public sectors and if public, which taxpayers?
This book follows the conference “Political, fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone?” that was held in Florence in 2013. In this publication, contributiors assess the prospects and potential for, as well as obstacles to, the various forms and degrees of integration needed within the Eurozone in order to address the root causes of Europe’s malaise as perceived at the time of writing. The text elaborate on the relationships between these different levels of union. Was one type of union achievable without the other? Or would the intractable difficulties of achieving each level of union spill over to lessen the chances of the other ever being a likely practical possibility?
This book contains the proceedings of the conference “Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration?” that was held in 2012. In three sections, the individual chapters consider the role of public financial institutions in dealing with the crisis and discuss the possibilities and limits of fiscal policy support. Furthermore, the various authors reflect on the reform of the political and economic architecture and on the crucial question of how to reform the growth and stability pact and how to construct sound mechanisms for providing liquidity to governments and financial institutions. Finally, the contributions analyse how the European Union and the EU can coexist, whether Europe is developing towards a two-speed Europe and what the consequence of such a development would entail for the governance of the Eurozone.
This book summarizes the views presented during the first Annual Conference in 2011. The first part considers the current situation including the situations in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the German constitution, EU law, the constraints on the ECB to buy up Eurozone government debt, and the European Financial Stability Fund. The second part covers how Eurozone sovereign bankruptcy might work, including collective action clauses, banking regulation given risky sovereign debt, the prevention of banking crises, and the sovereign equivalent of debtor-in-possession financing. The final part considers alternatives to sovereign bankruptcy including the possibility of leaving the Eurozone temporarily, an historical comparison of suspension of the Gold Standard, Argentina and other recent defaults, and the long run solution of Eurozone wide bonds and fiscal authority.