Contingent Convertible Debt Instruments (CoCos): regulatory use and market development | Enrico Perotti
This webinar addressed the new regulatory treatment of Contingent Convertible Debt instruments (CoCos) and the development of the underlying CoCo bond markets. The contractual feature of the existing stock of CoCo debt is analysed along various dimensions. First, in terms of their regulatory effectiveness in absorbing risk. Second, in terms of their impact on risk incentives and thus on their preventive effect. Third, we looked at the empirical evidence on the market response to their issuance. Finally, we discussed recent developments on the CoCo bond market in terms of issuances and prices.
Enrico Perotti (Ph.D. MIT) is Professor of International Finance at the University of Amsterdam, Member of the Scientific Committee of the Florence School of Banking and Finance and CEPR).
His advisory work has focused on policy advice on issues of banking, financial reforms and stability to the EC, ECB, IMF, DNB, Bank of England, the World Bank and the UK Treasury.